From the New York Times and David Brooks:
Those who emphasize process have said that the government of President Mohamed Morsi was freely elected and that its democratic support has been confirmed over and over. The most important thing, they say, is to protect the fragile democratic institutions and to oppose those who would destroy them through armed coup.
Democracy, the argument goes, will eventually calm extremism. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood may come into office with radical beliefs, but then they have to fix potholes and worry about credit ratings and popular opinion. Governing will make them more moderate.
Those who emphasize substance, on the other hand, argue that members of the Muslim Brotherhood are defined by certain beliefs. They reject pluralism, secular democracy and, to some degree, modernity. When you elect fanatics, they continue, you have not advanced democracy. You have empowered people who are going to wind up subverting democracy. The important thing is to get people like that out of power, even if it takes a coup. The goal is to weaken political Islam, by nearly any means.
World events of the past few months have vindicated those who take the substance side of the argument. It has become clear — in Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Gaza and elsewhere — that radical Islamists are incapable of running a modern government.
---“Defending the Coup,” by David Brooks, New York Times (7.4.2013)
A good article timely written. I often agree with David Brooks on substantive issues about democracy and democratic processes. I agreed with his piece in 2011 on the inherent failings and predictable failure of direct or plebiscite democracy (vs. the resilience and strength of representative democracy, a republic). And ample philosophical and practical support can be found for that position in the writings of Edmund Burke and James Madison (The Federalist Papers), among others (See my link below1).
Unsurprisingly, then, I also agree with Mr. Brooks on this issue, at least his basic analysis and conclusions. But we are unlikely to find much written about this issue by the founding fathers of the United States or early thinkers about democracy. That no such threat could arise among the political parties and interests under the new U.S. Constitution appears a common assumption shared largely without question. That is notable because the Federalist Papers considered a long list of potential threats to the proper functioning of government to be addressed by the proposed new constitution, a constitution to provide for a republic based on democratic processes and protected by a thoughtful balancing of federal and state powers. Yet it does not seem to have been seriously contemplated that there would be any threat to government or the republic, to democratic principles or processes, arising from non-democratic or totalitarian views of those parties and interests forming the government or elected to lead or participate in it.
And that was quite reasonable since there were no participating parties or factions advocating against democracy or for a totalitarian government in the young American republic (the monarchist Tories having badly lost the day). But today, even in some vocal quarters in the U.S., that same assumption appears to proceed without question in regard to new or struggling democracies in other countries, even where there are clearly substantial factions and parties which would seek elected leadership in order to undermine or rescind fair and effective democratic processes.
So simplistically black-and-white, so uninformed and unquestioning are so many in their understandings about the basic conditions required for democracy’s success, that blind support and defense arises for most any political process involving a popular vote. For far too many, any popular voting process is considered “democratic” and defensible in principle, regardless of structure or the nature of the contending parties, and further, is unquestioned in its expected efficacy. This is true whether it is a dysfunctional direct or plebiscite form of democracy, which is likely to fail, or a doomed process that involves the election of a party that disrespects or is set on subverting properly structured and functioning democratic principles and processes.
It is the latter condition that was allowed to take hold in Egypt. Expanding on my agreement with Mr. Brooks, I would argue his same points, but restate them this way: it is definitionally axiomatic that a totalitarian party or faction elected in a democratic process will not voluntarily give up power, which also means it will not again allow itself to be subject to a true, fair and authoritative democratic process. Is a religious party or faction by definition totalitarian? And when it governs, is the state by definition a theocracy? No, not necessarily; that depends entirely on its nature, dictates, and the larger body politic. But in the cases involving extremist Islamist political movements, whether elected or not, their avowed political interest and set direction for the state is toward an Islamist state, Sharia law, and the type of fundamentalist theocracy that is totalitarian indeed.
Is the Muslim Brotherhood different, as many have argued? Perhaps, but it now appears that if so, it was only in their patience and the time they were willing to invest to more effectively undermine the democratic process and move Egypt toward a more totalitarian Islamist state. In his article, Brooks cited several events and new directions authored by Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood backers that provide ample warning that they were moving faster than expected toward their goal—and doing it without inclusion, compromise, or apology. But in that accelerating process, Morsi has undermined himself and his apologists who hoped for a slower process of assuming and carrying out government responsibility, a process that might moderate their Islamist identity, make them more open to a pluralistic, democratic body politic, and bring them to effectively work within it. It appears that was never in the cards.
Now we have only questions. What role the military in the shorter and longer term, and will elections be held again anytime soon? The military-appointed interim president, Adli Mahmoud Mansour, says, yes, and has proposed a six-month time table for new elections. But no details about the process have been released. In setting expectations for the elections, is the interim president charged to move government back toward one better reflecting democratic values and processes? We must hope so. Are most of the people of Egypt now committed to both democratic elections and electing a government that will support and honor democratic institutions and processes? Have all sufficiently learned their lessons? Or is it too soon to expect Egypt’s political parties, factions and interests to be sufficiently healed, properly readied, and committed to assuring and respecting an effective democratic election and government process?
And will the Muslim Brotherhood be allowed to run candidates for office again? How can they, if the Brotherhood's demonstrated purpose is to subvert democratic institutions and processes and move toward a more Islamist state? If not, will they merely run proxy candidates under different organizational identities? If they do run again, officially or unofficially, and win, what then--yet another military take-over, and yet another military controlled government? And wouldn't that still be better than an increasingly antagonistic, Islamist government? Those are some of my questions.
1. (For access to my post on direct democracy, click here:
1 comment:
Great!
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