Friday, February 25, 2011

The PRC's Ascendancy: More on Reasons Why


I have a long and earnest interest in China. I have my reasons, good reasons, I believe. Part of it goes way back to my days of military service during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, when I was trained and worked as a Chinese crytologic linguist under one of our national intelligence services. Part of it is my general interest in Chinese art and history which I explore through a group I belong to in Naples. China has a long, fascinating, and impressive history of unique achievement. But most important is the ascendant, global economic and geopolitical profile of a country that is already a force to be reckoned with in the world, the trajectory of which is toward greater, possibly dominating global influence.

I often don't understand why others don't share my depth of interest and concern. The result is that I sometimes find myself in passing conversations in which I am eagerly trying to relate my understandings. But in trying to share them in a short discussion, I can err on the side of passion, and fail to convey a properly qualified and measured summary explanation. In these situations, I can be a poor emissary for those understandings and concerns. Allow me to try to do better here.

As I have said, I am something of a student of China, or at least a China junkie. I read everything I can in both the Chinese and Western press, and in the most respected journals I can find. And in recent years I have had and spent more time indulging that interest. But now, my more recent and continuing readings on China's dynastic history have given me a new perspective on their most recent "lost century," followed by their stunning ascendency of the last 30 years. I now understand that China has many times reshaped or restructured itself over periods of at least a century--or much longer--in the 4800-year history of a continuing Chinese polity and culture. In the long view, I've come to see China's newest ascendency as just China recreating itself again, a view also shared by some China analysts and historians. And the substantial, increasing number of educated Chinese in the PRC, and there leaders, are well aware of their illustrious dynastic history and, like their forbears, are by temperament or discipline given to taking the long view.

If this assessment is at all true and fair, the prospects for China--and for America in a world with China so dramatically ascendant--should be sobering to us. We can continue to be a successful, powerful, and respected world player, but only if we understand the new game we are now playing and the new and changing contours of the field we are playing on. It is a world of evolving multilateralism and increasing collaboration--a world of more shared global decision-making and accountability. And China will be offered its place among the leaders, or it will ascend to it by virtue and authority of its increasing global economic strength and the mutual dependency of the US, the West and China upon each other. It appears an inevitability; its just a matter of how constructively, how wisely we move more toward that relationship. 

The best informed analysts and commentators I have read suggest that we must understand China well, and also understand our well-considered goals and related needs for the future. Then we must devote the best of our creative, industrious capability and work effort to collaborate, partner with China wherever common national and international interests are found and allow. Their consensus view is that to compete with China from a zero-sum posture for command of environmental technology or global natural resources, for example, will prove a costly miscalculation and mistake, one which will cause all to lose. In both those areas, but particularly in environmental technology, China is already well ahead of us both in investment and progress--and they have extended to us the invitation to join them in sharing information and working collaboratively in the future. But our response has been tepid, and those who have reponded meaningfully at all appear to be a few companies, a think tank or two and NGOs, but not the government.

And then there is my respectful view of the Chinese people. That view holds that they have substantial capacity and potential to continue their evolving and quickly advancing societal and economic ascendency. This is often an unwelcome view; it can sound too strong, too unqualified, and carry too much the ring of destiny for most American tastes. Some people are uncomfortable with the notion of genetic determinism, with its inherited prescriptions and predispositions; they like even less cultural or conditioned determinism, that we are to some extent also a product of our environment. Yet there is a strong measure of scientific reality to both. And the question is usually, rightly posited in terms of whether nature or nurture is more dominant in explaining individual, societal or cultural behavioral--not whether either is an invalid or inoperative factor in explaining that behavior. One would have a hard time challenging the tested conclusion that the Chinese people as a whole, the dominant Han people, are an intrinsically intelligent people. And they have millenia of continually layered culture, successful culture in governance, bureaucracy, the arts, military arts and conquest, and yes, inventiveness, even creativity.

It is also important to observe that there were occasions when failed Chinese leadership, financial mismanagement, or social instability so weakened them that they were "conquered"--by Western tribal powers, by nomads of the Mongolian steppes (Genghis Khan), and the last dynasty, the Qing, was led by the Manchus from the far Northeast. So, what did that mean for the coninuity of Chinese civilization, identity and potential?

The most interesting thing is that, in each instance, dynastic China continued on with the conquerors taking the throne as Chinese emperors, and continuing the Chinese civilization! The Chinese scholar-leader-bureaucrats most often continued to be employed in shared or supporting leadership roles. The military was rebuilt and reshaped to serve the new merged dynasty. They took a Chinese dynastic name to designate the period of their reign. And they eventually became de facto Chinese!

So the Mongols ruled over the Yuan dynasty, and the Manchus over the Qing. It is a fair observation, with the course of history to substantiate it, that China absorbed all people, ideas, religions and philosophies that entered into Chinese civilization--even those who entered by invasion--and made them Chinese. They accepted them, but changed them, and absorbed them into what is Chinese. Buddhism brought from India was merged with Taoist ideas and produced Chan Buddhism, which when exported to Japan was called Zen. Only Confucianism--really more a philosophy and ethic for personal and leadership behavior--and Daoism are indigenous philosophy/spiritualities in China. The Chinese civilization is really the long-term amalgamation of many peoples and ideas.

I would also suggest that in the same way China has taken all that comes into its civilization and made it Chinese, it is also internalizing and fashioning its own Chinese approach to an internal market economy and competing in global markets--it's market socialism or state capitalism, as it is called. We'll just have to see how effective their uniquely Chinese approach will prove. But so far they appear to have gotten the world's attention, and their economic progress has been impressive.

Yet, we have not seen as much of that inventiveness and creativity out of China in the last century or so--but that likely had more to do with the repressive, increasingly anti-intellectual, anti-mercantile, anti-modernity climate moving from the Nationalist Revolution to the Communist Revolution and to the Cultural Revolution. For the last 30 years, they have been lifting themselves out of that cultural, intellectual, economic and geopolitical abyss. And now, they have emerged again on the world stage. I expect their historical inventiveness and creativity will continue to emerge as well.

Of course, as some observe, each new generation, each new era is...well, new. And a new Chinese generation in a new era, especially a new and advancing technological era, a more global, multilateral era, would arguably be cutting more from whole cloth, beginning anew, especially coming out of their "lost century." That would also imply a steep, daunting learning curve. Fair point, and doubtless valid in many respects and effects, as far as it goes. But there is something important to be recognized and appreciated about the power and contribution of a deep and long cultural history, especially a history that experienced many amazing expansions and contractions, ascending again and again to the heights of global culture. It must be observed that the current situation falls consistently on China's multimillenial trend line, one which reflects the many times China has come out of a failed political or economical situation, followed by a warring and fragmenting century or longer, only to restructure and reinvent itself, and ascend still higher ground of societal, military and economic advancement.

This time may be different. China surely has many daunting challenges. It is possible they may be too great to overcome. But I wouldn't look at those challenges as welcome or calming justifications to discount China's potential, for failing to take them seriously enough, for not understanding and respecting their history. The US has the potential to do that. There is a certain amount of American arrogance and triumphalism--sometimes just rank demogoguery and jingoism--that does not recognize shifting sands and the realities of a new environment. And our fledgling experience with democracy, a relative newcomer by historical standards, is as vulnerable as it is resilient. And it sometimes can prove near dysfunctional--or at the least very slow to act, and then to act only incrementally. Now appears to be such a time. Of course, historically we have always risen to the occasion in the face of threats to our people and way of life. But international economic competition and geopolitical maneuvering seldom appear as overtly and immediately threatening to us, not to the public, not in the same way as the military aggression of Germany and Japan before WWII, or of al Qaida on 9/11. And with the PRC, China, that is where the game is being played: global economic strength and power, and geopolitical influence.

Our government agencies (certainly the State Department and CIA) and the think tankers understand all this well enough, and likely much more. But most Americans do not. It would appear that many of our politicians do not either--or at least what we hear from them or their cable media proxies (and that's often all some people hear) appears filtered through the distorting prism of their ideological bias and/or their true lack of knowledge or understanding. For China's is a more responsive, effective and efficient governmental process than ours. Totalitarian governments can move more decisively, more quickly. It may or may not be as "good," depending on your definitions, your social values and goals. For it is unapologetically undemocratic, and its people are clearly less free; I wouldn't want to live there. But it is nonetheless very efficient, very effective. And their 30-year success in venturing into competitive, global markets is impressive--and their trajectory continues ascendant.

My concern is simply this: we should not underestimate the Chinese people or the Chinese government--and likewise we should not overestimate ourselves, especially in a weakened and confused time. Rather, let China's ascendancy be as a wake-up call for America, a challenge to claim and move to new, higher ground ourselves. Let us invite China to more meaningfully join in shared global leadership, responsibility and accountability. And if we would claim democracy as the high ground of social and economic advancement and potential, now is our time to bring out our best and prove it.

I just wanted you to understand.

Thursday, February 24, 2011

Army Targeted U.S. Senators With "Psychological Operations"


The U.S. army reportedly deployed a specialized "psychological operations" team to help convince American legislators to boost funding and troop numbers for the war in Afghanistan.
Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, a three-star general in charge of training Afghan troops, ordered the operation, Rolling Stone Magazine reported in a story published late on Wednesday. An officer in charge of the unit objected when he was ordered to pressure the visiting senators and was harshly reprimanded by superiors, according to the magazine.
"My job in psy-ops is to play with people's heads, to get the enemy to behave the way we want them to behave," the officer, Lt. Colonel Michael Holmes, told Rolling Stone. "I'm prohibited from doing that to our own people. When you ask me to try to use these skills on senators and congressman, you're crossing a line," he added.
You just can't make up stuff like this! I want to wax indignant about how unbelievable this is--but if you really think about it, it's not unbelievable at all. This is the military establishment we had already been given good reason to distrust over the last half century, the authors of a lot of unscrupulous, unjustifiable secret "research," testing on human subjects, questionable secret ops, and misleading reports on the progress of some of our military misadventures. They had often taken liberties beyond their charter, and then lied to us about it. This episode just confirms that that is still part of who they are, part of what they do. 

We had come to think that the military of Petraeus, Mullin and Gates was credible, straight up, whether we supported their view on Iraq or Afghanistan, or not--or at least some of us had. But if this report is at all credible--and it reads like we have reason to expect that it is--the Pentagon and military trustworthiness and credibility are now back in the dumper, and now with one of the most troubling, unnerving indictments in their history hanging over them. 

Yes, you could argue or spin this as just the military making its case, just old-fashioned jaw-boning, making sure legislators--especially those most friendly to their case--understand it and how to present it in the most convincing terms. But that would be spin indeed. This appears clearly over the line into wilfull manipulation without any pretense of balance or respect for their role and the role of our government. The Lt. Colonel whose job it was to do carry out authorized psyops was so troubled by what he was asked to do that he was willing to deliver a fatal blow to his career to go public with it. You've got to sense that the actions ordered were well over the line.

To say they have squandered any trust or good will they may have established in the last decade doesn't even begin to approach the seriousness, the presumption, the threatening disregard of their role relative to the civilian government that is implied by all this--threatening to our government and to us. Questions have been raised in the past about Petraeus' apparent overwillingness to be aggressive in his advocacy of the war, and whether he had served the president well and fairly in that posture. Gates has also been accused of indulging or supporting that posturing, or at least not reining it in. Is this more evidence of that? It's more than a little frightened that a second rogue flag officer--Gen. Stanley McChrystal being the first--was so willing and felt so justified to go so far off the reservation. One is arguably an exception, two suggests a leadership climate that allows it to operate, perhaps even encourages it.

Thursday, February 3, 2011

Today's PRC: Not Your Father's Communist China

[In a recent discussion in my Chinese Art & History Group, I made a poorly framed statement that appeared to puzzle some. The simple, but unqualified statement was that, "China is not so much a communist country anymore, at least not in the way we used to think about them." A tangential comment, there was not time to expand upon it; so once again I addressed the comment in a follow-up e-mail, which here follows.]


The People's Republic of China (PRC) is still ruled by a self-determining, autocratic leadership organization that calls itself the Chinese Communist Party. But things have changed, a lot of things. By any other name, it is still totalitarian, but a careful, thoughtful totalitarianism that knows it must continue to improve the quality of life and opportunity for it's people--and as more of its people become more worldly, the quality of life will be measured more against global standards. They continue to move themselves upward toward global technological and economic strength and, in many respects, toward global leadership. 

But it is rightly pointed out that, to a considerable extent, the PRC still has its hands deeply in national and international economic analysis and planning--but more and more from a macroeconomic and policy position, much less from an international markets perspective--over which it has limited influence--and less from a local or regional markets perspective, as well. China believes this larger, overarching role played by the state allows better management of the cycles and excesses of markets for capital, goods and services. And many emerging countries looking at the "Beijing model" are more and more impressed with it. The rest of us are watching and assessing, trying to sort out how to make more effective and efficient a frustratingly slow or unresponsive democratic governing and legislative processes.

Ownership of property and businesses is now widespread in China, and growing. Entrepreneurship is not only allowed, but encouraged, and promising ventures are assisted by the state. And yes, the state directs the development of those areas it wants to treat as national priorities, providing favorable financing and such other help as it can arrange to advance their success. And the state often takes substantial minority ownership in the most promising and successful companies. As to local and regional businesses, most area providers of products and services are privately owned businesses. And they are most often thriving, at least in the eastern and central urban centers; but they have a long way to go in the countryside where people are still poor, and where delivery of both market and public goods and services are inadequate.

So the PRC is not your father's communist country anymore. It is not the "people's republic" in the same way it once was in the times of the communist and cultural revolutions. The state does not own or control the factors of production in the way it once did (although it regulates them, and directly or indirectly strongly influences most of them); and it no longer plans or manages supply chain or production processes, as it so ineptly once tried to do. (The early Leninist-inspired "Great Leap Forward" was an unqualified state-planning and economic failure.) But now, for their large and international companies, those processes are driven largely by the standards and dictates of international markets, their customers and suppliers--and yes, their own internal regulatory processes. 

China now also approves and encourages the risk-reward, performance compensation approach that is essential to market economies, providing that companies' and individual's success should command market-based profits and wealth; and more, they track and measure those companies by their growth in profitability. There are a lot of wealthy entrepreneurs in China today. There is also a well-compensated management and professional class. Yes, the "bourgeoisie" too now ascends with an ascendant China. And the PRC has increasingly become a formidable competitor in international markets--complaints or charges of unfair tactics notwithstanding. It cannot be surprising, then, that thousands of educated American Chinese--and those Chinese nationals educated and working in the U.S.--have returned to China to be part of it's cultural, economic and geopolitical ascendency. However one may characterize the societal and professional experience in China, it appears to be an acceptable, even exciting experience for them.

But it is not a democracy, to be sure--although some democratic features are recognized as essential to effective business practices, and even included in some local government. They do strive to include those practices that make their economy and society operate more effectively and efficiently. But if democratic practices or voices threaten their standards of social, political and economic stability, they are deemed no longer useful and disallowed. It's all very utilitarian.

Yet, one still might acknowledge that there has evolved a considerable degree of relative freedom allowed most Chinese people--even for the politically-critical modern artists who have found a home in Beijing's 798 warehouse district, it would seem. And more, it is reported that a 2008 poll by the independent Pew Research Center found 86% of Chinese people satisfied with their country, their leadership and economy, and the direction they are going. Still, it is also important to observe that their history of disregard for human rights, abuse of the rule of law, and the uneven delivery of justice, leaves one understandably concerned for the security, the durability, of their social progress.

In an earlier stage of the PRC's venture into market economics, they had referred to their new direction as "market socialism." In less political or ideological terms, one could simply and fairly characterize it as a "mixed economy," a term often pressed into use to refer to a range of economies characterized to some extent by both market economics and social program agendas, both democratic and nondemocratic. Of course, that could cover everything from the modern PRC to Western social democracies--and yes, even the U.S.

But now, more and more, one hears or reads of the PRC's evolving economic model described as "state capitalism." This is a term that has been variously defined across the twentieth century, starting with Engles and then others of various politcal persuasions through the decades. But China understands what it is doing, and if we want to call it state capitalism, the PRC has defined their version of it for us. An excerpt from an article by Ian Bremmer:
In September 2008, just as the Western financial crisis was beginning to dominate the world's attention, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao sat down for an extraordinary interview with CNN's Fareed Zakaria. During their conversation, Wen provided what amounts to a precisely worded definition of Chinese state capitalism: "The complete formulation of our economic policy is to give full play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources under the macroeconomic guidance and regulation of the government. We have one important piece of experience of the past thirty years, that is to ensure that both the visible hand and invisible hand are given full play in regulating the market forces."
---"The Rise of State Capitalism, " by Ian Bremmer, which was excerpted from his book, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations (2010).
Whatever you call it, and however you define it, The PRC's government and economic development has so far proved more efficient and effective than many would have projected, even if they still have many challenges ahead of them. If it is not anyone's idea of a democratic republic, if we look at them warily with a measure of distrust, even fear--and we do--we still have to be in awe of what they have accomplished, how far they have so quickly come, and how resiliently they continue to shape or evolve their country and their economy.

And I can't help but consider that the foundation of their identity and potential is their cumulative historical cultural identity: the creativity, strength and cultural resilience of the Zhou, the Han, the Tang, the Ming--likely the most resilient and successful continuous culture in the history of the world. So, one might be excused for taking the long view, and seeing their most recent lost century as merely another historical restructuring blip in the near five-millenia-long history of China successfully remaking itself.

[If you are interested in a more ordered and comprehensive look at today's PRC, Wikipedia offers a competent, readable and continually-updated account of it's evolving changes and what it is like today, both the good and bad. Just Google The People's Republic of China, Wikipedia.]