Recent articles have made the sober observation that reactionary Maoists may be having more influence on events in China than we appreciate. And those events would include the seeming over-reactions to the risk of a Chinese "jasmine revolution," the detention and harrassment of artist and social critic Ai Wei Wei among many others, and the removal of the Confucius statue from Tienanmen.
It's not that the potential for social unrest related to economic challenges and societal dislocations in China are not sufficient in themselves to draw out the repressive tendencies of more conservative Chinese leaders. They are. It's not that the leadership's hold on societal stability might be more fragile than we realized. It very well may be--and the party conservatives likely see it just that way. But China's increasingly progressive leadership have made much progress in these areas over the last few decades. We would have expected that moderate leadership would hold sway and be more cautious about such a broad-based repressive campaign. But that failing, it is only reasonable to look for other factors or influences, as well, to expect there is more to it than we know. And in this already fragile societal context, it appears likely the resurgent confidence of Maoist voices are also influencing the actions of conservative and moderate leaders alike.
Naples friend from the Chinese Art & History Group, Eila McKenzie, recently visited her son in Beijing and kindly shared the surprisingly nonplussed, ground-level reaction she encountered to the recent removal of the Confucius statue: a shrug of their collective shoulders and puzzlement at concerns that it should much matter. But to the Maoist reactionaries, it apparently did matter--as was reported in the NYT article I cited in my recent post, "Confucius Vanishes from Tienanmen Square" (4.29.11). Now an Economist article also suggests the increasing volume of these Maoist voices are influencing the nervous, repressive inclinations of the PRC party leadership in these several situations. From The Economist:
It's not that the potential for social unrest related to economic challenges and societal dislocations in China are not sufficient in themselves to draw out the repressive tendencies of more conservative Chinese leaders. They are. It's not that the leadership's hold on societal stability might be more fragile than we realized. It very well may be--and the party conservatives likely see it just that way. But China's increasingly progressive leadership have made much progress in these areas over the last few decades. We would have expected that moderate leadership would hold sway and be more cautious about such a broad-based repressive campaign. But that failing, it is only reasonable to look for other factors or influences, as well, to expect there is more to it than we know. And in this already fragile societal context, it appears likely the resurgent confidence of Maoist voices are also influencing the actions of conservative and moderate leaders alike.
Naples friend from the Chinese Art & History Group, Eila McKenzie, recently visited her son in Beijing and kindly shared the surprisingly nonplussed, ground-level reaction she encountered to the recent removal of the Confucius statue: a shrug of their collective shoulders and puzzlement at concerns that it should much matter. But to the Maoist reactionaries, it apparently did matter--as was reported in the NYT article I cited in my recent post, "Confucius Vanishes from Tienanmen Square" (4.29.11). Now an Economist article also suggests the increasing volume of these Maoist voices are influencing the nervous, repressive inclinations of the PRC party leadership in these several situations. From The Economist:
The petition bore the names of nearly 10,000 people accusing a liberal intellectual of slandering Mao Zedong and attempting to overthrow the Communist Party itself. Emboldened by a chill political wind, diehard Maoists in China are rising to confront their critics.
The Maoists' appeal for the arrest of Mao Yushi, a well-known economist (and no relation of the late chairman), is their most concerted public attempt in many years to put pressure on the government. A clutch of Maoist websites frequently vilify intellectuals such as Mr Mao. But campaigning openly for someone to be put on trial is unusual. It is a symptom of a recent escalation of ideological struggles between China's West-leaning liberals and conservative hardliners. The Maoists froth at the extreme fringe of the hardline camp. But their cause is gaining headway as the authorities wage an intense crackdown on dissent, putting pressure on NGOs and arresting or otherwise making vanish dozens of government critics.
---"Liberalism under attack in China: Boundlessly loyal to the great monster," The Economist, Asia Section (5.28.11)
And this has played on the concerns of the party leadership about their economic challenges, societal dislocations and related social unrest. And then there is the approaching 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the importance of setting the right balance in content and tone for a successful national celebration. More from the same article:
All year the Communist Party has been jittery about the possible spread of Arab-style "jasmine revolution" to China. (The word "jasmine" has been all but banned in the media, as has the flower itself in markets.) Now the party is all the more anxious as it prepares to celebrate, on July 1st, the 90th anniversary of its founding. It does not want the occasion to be clouded by misgivings about the man who led it to power. Mao is too intimately linked with the party's identity to allow any further examination of the "mistakes" the party sheepishly admitted he made, five years after his death in 1976.
But the increasing liberal majority in the party leadership, the force and vision behind China's slow evolution toward a modern nation with its own brand of market socialism and advanced society, will not stand by and allow their direction to be reversed. Instead, they will likely do what they always do: patiently bend as necessary, give what must be given, to get past this challenge to their progress. And it is a time of many other significant economic, societal, and political challenges for China. Doubtless that is why more strident Maoist voices are now being heard and joined. As in the case of America's Tea Party, conservative populist alternatives always seem to draw more dissident voices in times of economic and social unhappiness. But this too will likely pass, and China will step back on the road of measured but certain social progress. At least, that is what we should be hoping for: that they will patiently wait out and work through their problems, then again move intentionally, with dispatch, to take advantage of their opportunities. The general thinking and concerns of some of China's government and business leaders suggest they understand the problem, and are impliedly addressing it. From the same article:
A relative liberal, Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, in a meeting with a visitor from Hong Kong in April, said two forces were causing difficulties for China's reform efforts. One, Mr Wen said, was "vestiges of feudal society" (party-speak for conservatism). The other, he added, was the "pernicious influence of the Cultural Revolution". Apologists for that orgy of violence, destruction and persecution in the latter years of Mao's rule abound in China's Maoist circles. Qin Xiao, a former chairman of China Merchants Bank and a prominent moderniser, warned in an interview this month that the "evil habits" of the Cultural Revolution were in danger of resurfacing. At least this time, in contrast to earlier hardline crackdowns, some liberals are fighting back.
But the article and these quotes from Wen Jiabao and Qin Xiao hardly substantiate that "liberals are fighting back." The quote from Wen Jiabao states that the two elements "causing difficulties for China's reform efforts" were the party conservatives and the Maoists--which merely states the problem. The prominent banker says more or less the same. Of course, the implication is that reform efforts are ongoing. Regardless, it is fair to expect that the more liberal Chinese leadership are continuing their efforts--but as carefully, wisely, as they can, including doing what Chinese leadership does well: patiently take the long view, bending where they must, conceding what they must, and planning their stronger responses and initatives for when better economic and social winds are blowing.
China is negotiating a rough section of road. And they will have a difficult time keeping their progress parade marching in line and properly ordered. But however clumsy and halting their short-term progress, however unwelcome some of their methods, in due course they will likely find their way to smoother, more reliable footing. Then the progress parade will again move steadily to a more stable economic and societal beat, and progressives will again hold sway in advancing their social agenda. The Maoists will become fewer in number and more marginalized with every passing decade. At least, that's how we must earnestly hope it will all evolve.
Link:
China is negotiating a rough section of road. And they will have a difficult time keeping their progress parade marching in line and properly ordered. But however clumsy and halting their short-term progress, however unwelcome some of their methods, in due course they will likely find their way to smoother, more reliable footing. Then the progress parade will again move steadily to a more stable economic and societal beat, and progressives will again hold sway in advancing their social agenda. The Maoists will become fewer in number and more marginalized with every passing decade. At least, that's how we must earnestly hope it will all evolve.
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