Thursday, February 3, 2011

Today's PRC: Not Your Father's Communist China

[In a recent discussion in my Chinese Art & History Group, I made a poorly framed statement that appeared to puzzle some. The simple, but unqualified statement was that, "China is not so much a communist country anymore, at least not in the way we used to think about them." A tangential comment, there was not time to expand upon it; so once again I addressed the comment in a follow-up e-mail, which here follows.]


The People's Republic of China (PRC) is still ruled by a self-determining, autocratic leadership organization that calls itself the Chinese Communist Party. But things have changed, a lot of things. By any other name, it is still totalitarian, but a careful, thoughtful totalitarianism that knows it must continue to improve the quality of life and opportunity for it's people--and as more of its people become more worldly, the quality of life will be measured more against global standards. They continue to move themselves upward toward global technological and economic strength and, in many respects, toward global leadership. 

But it is rightly pointed out that, to a considerable extent, the PRC still has its hands deeply in national and international economic analysis and planning--but more and more from a macroeconomic and policy position, much less from an international markets perspective--over which it has limited influence--and less from a local or regional markets perspective, as well. China believes this larger, overarching role played by the state allows better management of the cycles and excesses of markets for capital, goods and services. And many emerging countries looking at the "Beijing model" are more and more impressed with it. The rest of us are watching and assessing, trying to sort out how to make more effective and efficient a frustratingly slow or unresponsive democratic governing and legislative processes.

Ownership of property and businesses is now widespread in China, and growing. Entrepreneurship is not only allowed, but encouraged, and promising ventures are assisted by the state. And yes, the state directs the development of those areas it wants to treat as national priorities, providing favorable financing and such other help as it can arrange to advance their success. And the state often takes substantial minority ownership in the most promising and successful companies. As to local and regional businesses, most area providers of products and services are privately owned businesses. And they are most often thriving, at least in the eastern and central urban centers; but they have a long way to go in the countryside where people are still poor, and where delivery of both market and public goods and services are inadequate.

So the PRC is not your father's communist country anymore. It is not the "people's republic" in the same way it once was in the times of the communist and cultural revolutions. The state does not own or control the factors of production in the way it once did (although it regulates them, and directly or indirectly strongly influences most of them); and it no longer plans or manages supply chain or production processes, as it so ineptly once tried to do. (The early Leninist-inspired "Great Leap Forward" was an unqualified state-planning and economic failure.) But now, for their large and international companies, those processes are driven largely by the standards and dictates of international markets, their customers and suppliers--and yes, their own internal regulatory processes. 

China now also approves and encourages the risk-reward, performance compensation approach that is essential to market economies, providing that companies' and individual's success should command market-based profits and wealth; and more, they track and measure those companies by their growth in profitability. There are a lot of wealthy entrepreneurs in China today. There is also a well-compensated management and professional class. Yes, the "bourgeoisie" too now ascends with an ascendant China. And the PRC has increasingly become a formidable competitor in international markets--complaints or charges of unfair tactics notwithstanding. It cannot be surprising, then, that thousands of educated American Chinese--and those Chinese nationals educated and working in the U.S.--have returned to China to be part of it's cultural, economic and geopolitical ascendency. However one may characterize the societal and professional experience in China, it appears to be an acceptable, even exciting experience for them.

But it is not a democracy, to be sure--although some democratic features are recognized as essential to effective business practices, and even included in some local government. They do strive to include those practices that make their economy and society operate more effectively and efficiently. But if democratic practices or voices threaten their standards of social, political and economic stability, they are deemed no longer useful and disallowed. It's all very utilitarian.

Yet, one still might acknowledge that there has evolved a considerable degree of relative freedom allowed most Chinese people--even for the politically-critical modern artists who have found a home in Beijing's 798 warehouse district, it would seem. And more, it is reported that a 2008 poll by the independent Pew Research Center found 86% of Chinese people satisfied with their country, their leadership and economy, and the direction they are going. Still, it is also important to observe that their history of disregard for human rights, abuse of the rule of law, and the uneven delivery of justice, leaves one understandably concerned for the security, the durability, of their social progress.

In an earlier stage of the PRC's venture into market economics, they had referred to their new direction as "market socialism." In less political or ideological terms, one could simply and fairly characterize it as a "mixed economy," a term often pressed into use to refer to a range of economies characterized to some extent by both market economics and social program agendas, both democratic and nondemocratic. Of course, that could cover everything from the modern PRC to Western social democracies--and yes, even the U.S.

But now, more and more, one hears or reads of the PRC's evolving economic model described as "state capitalism." This is a term that has been variously defined across the twentieth century, starting with Engles and then others of various politcal persuasions through the decades. But China understands what it is doing, and if we want to call it state capitalism, the PRC has defined their version of it for us. An excerpt from an article by Ian Bremmer:
In September 2008, just as the Western financial crisis was beginning to dominate the world's attention, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao sat down for an extraordinary interview with CNN's Fareed Zakaria. During their conversation, Wen provided what amounts to a precisely worded definition of Chinese state capitalism: "The complete formulation of our economic policy is to give full play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources under the macroeconomic guidance and regulation of the government. We have one important piece of experience of the past thirty years, that is to ensure that both the visible hand and invisible hand are given full play in regulating the market forces."
---"The Rise of State Capitalism, " by Ian Bremmer, which was excerpted from his book, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations (2010).
Whatever you call it, and however you define it, The PRC's government and economic development has so far proved more efficient and effective than many would have projected, even if they still have many challenges ahead of them. If it is not anyone's idea of a democratic republic, if we look at them warily with a measure of distrust, even fear--and we do--we still have to be in awe of what they have accomplished, how far they have so quickly come, and how resiliently they continue to shape or evolve their country and their economy.

And I can't help but consider that the foundation of their identity and potential is their cumulative historical cultural identity: the creativity, strength and cultural resilience of the Zhou, the Han, the Tang, the Ming--likely the most resilient and successful continuous culture in the history of the world. So, one might be excused for taking the long view, and seeing their most recent lost century as merely another historical restructuring blip in the near five-millenia-long history of China successfully remaking itself.

[If you are interested in a more ordered and comprehensive look at today's PRC, Wikipedia offers a competent, readable and continually-updated account of it's evolving changes and what it is like today, both the good and bad. Just Google The People's Republic of China, Wikipedia.]

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