First, some quotes from Newsweek and Time:
"At least we have something in common with America," the [Taliban] logistics officer says. "The Pakistanis are playing a double game with us, too."
Pakistan's ongoing support of the Afghan Taliban is anything but news to insurgents who have spoken to NEWSWEEK. Requesting anonymity for security reasons, many of them readily admit their utter dependence on the country's [Pakistan's] Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) not only for sanctuary and safe passage but also, some say, for much of their financial support. The logistics officer, speaking at his mud-brick compound near the border, offers an unverifiable estimate that Pakistan provides roughly 80 percent of the insurgents' funding, based on his conversations with other senior Taliban. He says the insurgents could barely cover their expenses in Kandahar province alone if not for the ISI. Not that he views them as friends. "They feed us with one hand and arrest and kill us with the other," he says.
Where is Mullah Omar? Is he alive? Is he in charge? And if not, then who is?
A clear answer to those questions would very likely decide whether the Afghan insurgency stands or falls. Everyone agrees that absolute loyalty to Mullah Omar is what holds the Taliban together. Practically to a man, the group's commanders and fighters say they're fighting for the village cleric they call the "commander of the faithful" and for the restoration of his Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. "Every Taliban knows that the morale and unity of the insurgency depend on Mullah Omar," says a senior Taliban intelligence officer, asking not to be named for security reasons. "We are all fighting for him." Without their faith in Mullah Omar's divinely inspired leadership, the Taliban would almost surely collapse into a welter of rival clans and factions.
Are you confused yet? Let me make things more complicated: Afghanistan is really a sideshow here. Pakistan is the primary U.S. national-security concern in the region. It has a nuclear stockpile, and lives under the threat of an Islamist coup by some of the very elements in its military who created and support the Taliban.
They were published with fanfare and a flash of excitement, but overnight it dissipated like a puff of smoke in a gentle breeze. The WikiLeaks' leak of 91,000 or so secret documents--U.S. military field reports from Afghanistan--were quickly recognized as much ado about things we already knew. (Except, no doubt, for those Afghan informants whose names were not edited out.)
Highlighted among the disclosures was further evidence of the troubling, ongoing support of the Taliban by Pakistan, and more particularly by its powerful intelligence service, the ISI. Pakistan has continued to consistently and strongly deny the support relationship, but the evidence is too strong to place credence in the denials.
We can thank our in-country press for what we know about this--and the U.S. military, the Afghan government, and the Taliban, for the access they are given. And by the time the Wiki leaks hit the Internet, some of our journalists were already digging deeper, interviewing Taliban commanders, intelligence, and logistical personnel, talking to experts in think tanks, academe, and government. By early August, the articles quoted above were filed. And the story just gets increasingly troubling, albeit so very logical and practical from Pakistan's viewpoint.
If we can't be certain just how much financial support Pakistan is providing the Taliban, we at least know it is substantial and that they could not sustain their operations on anything like the current scale without it. More, they could not elude the U.S. and Afghan forces were it not for the escape routes and shelter in western Pakistan, which they are permitted. All of which implies strongly that the Taliban could not successfully wage war against the U.S. and Afghan forces without Pakistan's partnership. So, why do we continue to be a party to this public lie, indulge this ruse, with the lives of our soldiers and marines the price being paid?
And partnership is not the right word, but not because Pakistan's role is less than that. To the contrary, less than a partner, even less than a client organization, most of the Taliban appear to operate in cowed subordination to Pakistan's ISI, while pursuing their own goals and agenda as well as they can. If their goal is to restore Mullah Omar and an Islamic state in Afghanistan, they are nonetheless substantially under the control of Pakistan's military and ISI, and therefore must also serve Pakistan's regional interests. And they know it, as they have shared with a number of journalists. From the Time article:
Kilcullen recommended that the committee members read a recent paper by Matt Waldman of Harvard University's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy called "The Sun in the Sky." The paper is astonishing.
From February to May this year, the author conducted separate interviews with nine active Taliban field commanders in Afghanistan and 10 former Taliban officials. The commanders are unanimous in their belief that the ISI is running the show. Some of them received training and protection in Pakistani camps run by the ISI. "[The ISI has] specific groups under their control," one commander says. "The ISI [also] has people working for it within the Taliban movement. It is clearer than the sun in the sky."
And just to be sure their relationship is clear, while providing financial support, escape routes and shelter, Pakistan also rounds up various Taliban leaders from time to time, holds them, interrogates them, indoctrinates them. (It appears the ISI know just where the various Taliban leaders can be found at any time, and can capture them at will.) They are released back to their organizations only when reciprocal assurances have been provided that Taliban operations will function consistent with Pakistan's interests and directions. That's the quid pro quo. From the Newsweek article (7.31.10):
Every Taliban can recite a long list of insurgent leaders who have been arrested in Pakistan or who were killed in Afghanistan with assumed Pakistani complicity...The insurgents say [they were] too brazen, too independent, and too close to al Qaeda for Pakistan's comfort.
That illustrates a central point, Taliban say: the only thing Pakistan can be relied on for is a single-minded pursuit of its own national interest. Some ISI operatives may sympathize with the Taliban cause. But more important is Pakistan's desire to have a hand in Afghan politics and to restrict Indian influence there. "They're neither in bed with the [Afghan] Taliban nor opposed to them," says Stephen Biddle, an analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The reality is that they're in between, which is the rational place for them to be."
The insurgents say they, too, never know what to expect from the Pakistanis. "Sometimes they're angry, sometimes friendly," says a district commander in southern Afghanistan. "Sometimes they want to show us who's boss." No Afghan insurgent can be sure he's safe, says the smuggler, a former Taliban subcommander. After all, he observes, some of the Taliban commanders arrested by the Pakistanis were once favorites of the ISI. "They're like psychopaths," he says. "One minute your friend, the next minute your enemy."
Taliban sources say Pakistan uses catch-and-release tactics to keep insurgent leaders in line. All told, the ISI has picked up some 300 Taliban commanders and officials, the sources say. Before being freed, the detainees are subjected to indoctrination sessions to remind them that they owe their freedom and their absolute loyalty to Pakistan, no matter what.
But what of the Taliban's unifying raison d'être of fighting for Mullah Omar, and their goal of "restoration of his Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan"? What about the questions posed in the Newsweek article (8.8.10) quoted in the introduction, above? "Where is Mullah Omar? Is he alive? Is he in charge? And if not, then who is?"
Good questions. But no one has reliable answers. Still, intelligently deductive speculation offers some provocative possibilities, including some by the Taliban themselves. From the Newsweek article (7.31.10):
Good questions. But no one has reliable answers. Still, intelligently deductive speculation offers some provocative possibilities, including some by the Taliban themselves. From the Newsweek article (7.31.10):
Some leading Taliban even suspect that Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader and symbol of their jihad, may also be in ISI custody. He has appeared in no videos and issued no verifiable audio messages or written statements since he disappeared into the Kandahar mountains on the back of Baradar's motorcycle in late 2001. "I wouldn't be surprised if the ISI arrested us all in one day," says a former cabinet minister. "We are like sheep the Pakistanis can round up whenever they want." 8.31.10
It would appear likely that Pakistan's ISI does hold Mullah Omar. If he had been killed, and the US or UN forces were involved or knew of it, they would surely have been crowing about it. The death of such a high-value target, one so entwined with the identity and purpose of the Taliban, would be an event they would want every Taliban to know about. It would be a dispiriting setback, a source of disillusionment, and result in disarray among Taliban leadership and fighters alike. Yes, they would want that known.
Since we have heard nothing of his death, that leaves only a couple other possibilities. One, he died among the Taliban, and their leaders are keeping it a secret. Unlikely, for as we just noted, there would have been a scramble for new leadership, and those who aspired and failed would likely have been killed, or the source of friction and division among the Taliban groups. There have been no such reports or intelligence leaked or signaled. And could the diverse groups and interests among the Taliban keep such a thing secret for long? In fact, the broader Taliban leadership appear to believe that he is alive and hold desperately to that possibility, that hope, for they know what his death will mean to the unity of the movement.
So we are left with the likelihood that Pakistan is holding Mullah Omar, the ultimate card in the game of control and direction played with the Taliban. Based on what is known, nothing else makes as much sense. And so the Pakistan government continues to play out the ruse with the US. From the same Newsweek article (8.31.10):
Since we have heard nothing of his death, that leaves only a couple other possibilities. One, he died among the Taliban, and their leaders are keeping it a secret. Unlikely, for as we just noted, there would have been a scramble for new leadership, and those who aspired and failed would likely have been killed, or the source of friction and division among the Taliban groups. There have been no such reports or intelligence leaked or signaled. And could the diverse groups and interests among the Taliban keep such a thing secret for long? In fact, the broader Taliban leadership appear to believe that he is alive and hold desperately to that possibility, that hope, for they know what his death will mean to the unity of the movement.
So we are left with the likelihood that Pakistan is holding Mullah Omar, the ultimate card in the game of control and direction played with the Taliban. Based on what is known, nothing else makes as much sense. And so the Pakistan government continues to play out the ruse with the US. From the same Newsweek article (8.31.10):
The Pakistanis, for their part, continue to resist U.S. pressure for strikes against Taliban sanctuaries. "Their aim seems to be to prolong the war in Afghanistan by aiding both the Americans and us," says the logistics officer. "That way Pakistan continues to receive billions from the U.S., remains a key regional player, and still maintains influence with [the Taliban]."
(And what of Osama bin Laden? Does the same analysis suggest that the ISI holds Osama bin Laden, or knows where he is hiding? Some have suggested that is the case, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who last May embraced that view. But for now, a muted Osama bin Laden at-large likely serves Pakistan's interest in perpetuating a destabilized Afghanistan and maintaining the US commitment to a military presence there.)
The US, impliedly, plays along knowing it has little choice if any semblance of stability is to be maintained in the region. And, increasingly, it appears, the US is coming to appreciate that Pakistan's game plan may be a practical, default answer they can live with, especially if they and the UN can remain active and influential in regional diplomacy, maintain military and political balance, and thereby assure reasonable stability in the region. But what are Pakistan's interests? What motivates the end game they play? From the Time article (7.29.10):
The US, impliedly, plays along knowing it has little choice if any semblance of stability is to be maintained in the region. And, increasingly, it appears, the US is coming to appreciate that Pakistan's game plan may be a practical, default answer they can live with, especially if they and the UN can remain active and influential in regional diplomacy, maintain military and political balance, and thereby assure reasonable stability in the region. But what are Pakistan's interests? What motivates the end game they play? From the Time article (7.29.10):
Why on earth are elements of the Pakistani military supporting the Taliban? In a word, India. India is, first and last, the strategic obsession of the Pakistani military. The U.S. has come and gone from the region in the past; the perceived Indian threat is eternal. With the defeat of the Taliban by U.S. forces in 2001, there was fear that the new government in Kabul would be sympathetic to India and provide a strategic base for anti-Pakistan intelligence operations.
And so, despite professions of alliance with the U.S. by Pakistan's then dictator Pervez Musharraf, a decision was made to keep the Taliban alive. A spigot of untargeted military aid from the George W. Bush Administration helped fund the effort. A commander of the vicious Haqqani Taliban network tells Waldman that their funding comes from "the Americans — from them to the Pakistani military, and then to us."
But what of the Pakistan Taliban attacks against Pakistan targets? First, Pakistan does not control all of the Taliban; some groups will not be played in the same way as others. Some are not cowed, and would challenge Pakistan's capability to control them. They understand that Pakistan's interests are not their own; and they have concluded their cause is better off without Pakistani protection and financing if that is the cost of their independence and the integrity of their mission. But they are likely rethinking that after their attacks on Pakistani targets resulted in full-scale retaliatory attacks by the Pakistan army. And, as we've noted, many of those leaders eventually end up imprisoned or dead. Pakistan will do what it takes to make the Taliban leaders see clearly that they cannot win against Pakistan and the ISI with the tactics they use against the U.S. and UN forces. They must understand that they exist only at the forbearance of Pakistan.
And what about al Qaida? Aren't they still a threat in Afghanistan? Not much, apparently. The last US estimates report that there are now only about 100 al Qaida operatives still present in Afghanistan. And it would appear that Pakistan offers no sympathy to al Qaida and would be unlikely to afford them sanctuary. As the Newsweek (7.31.10) quote above noted, some Taliban insurgents were, "too close to al Qaeda for Pakistan's comfort." Al Qaida is apparently seen by Pakistan much as they are seen by most other countries: a destabilizing threat to their government, social order, and areas of influence. But that does not mean they cannot be abided to the extent they serve Pakistan's purposes.
To Conclude:
If any reasonable level of confidence can be invested in the articles cited, and the reports and interviews on which they are based, they lead to a credible, more detailed and nuanced understanding of how and why Pakistan is supporting the Taliban--even as they deny it and profess to be America's ally.
Is it all about India? Yes, that troubled relationship is likely at the heart of it all, but ambitions are also implied by Pakistan's strategy. It appears to represent both a national defense strategy and hegemonic ambitions. With its nuclear capability, it aspires to acknowledged regional power and authority. It would also be seen as an emerging international influence, a voice to the world at large. But like Iran, it lacks the international economic, political and cultural credibility to be viewed that way. And Pakistan knows that. They must play out their ruse and effect their strategy one step at a time, waiting for all the pieces to fall in place--waiting for the US and the UN to see the inevitability and acceptability of their designs.
The Time article offers these observations in recognizing the direction of it all:
And what about al Qaida? Aren't they still a threat in Afghanistan? Not much, apparently. The last US estimates report that there are now only about 100 al Qaida operatives still present in Afghanistan. And it would appear that Pakistan offers no sympathy to al Qaida and would be unlikely to afford them sanctuary. As the Newsweek (7.31.10) quote above noted, some Taliban insurgents were, "too close to al Qaeda for Pakistan's comfort." Al Qaida is apparently seen by Pakistan much as they are seen by most other countries: a destabilizing threat to their government, social order, and areas of influence. But that does not mean they cannot be abided to the extent they serve Pakistan's purposes.
To Conclude:
If any reasonable level of confidence can be invested in the articles cited, and the reports and interviews on which they are based, they lead to a credible, more detailed and nuanced understanding of how and why Pakistan is supporting the Taliban--even as they deny it and profess to be America's ally.
Is it all about India? Yes, that troubled relationship is likely at the heart of it all, but ambitions are also implied by Pakistan's strategy. It appears to represent both a national defense strategy and hegemonic ambitions. With its nuclear capability, it aspires to acknowledged regional power and authority. It would also be seen as an emerging international influence, a voice to the world at large. But like Iran, it lacks the international economic, political and cultural credibility to be viewed that way. And Pakistan knows that. They must play out their ruse and effect their strategy one step at a time, waiting for all the pieces to fall in place--waiting for the US and the UN to see the inevitability and acceptability of their designs.
The Time article offers these observations in recognizing the direction of it all:
...the relationship between Pakistan and the Karzai government has warmed considerably. Karzai removed his intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, whom the Pakistanis considered an Indian agent. There is talk of a reconciliation deal in which the Haqqani [Taliban] network will stand down militarily. Most important, the Pakistanis' sense of the perceived [India] threat has changed dramatically over the past 18 months. After a series of spectacular terrorist attacks, the army launched a major campaign against the indigenous Pakistani Taliban. More Pakistani army personnel have been killed in this fight than U.S. forces in Afghanistan by the Taliban...
The one thing the U.S. can do to reduce that threat is to convince the Pakistanis that we will be a reliable friend for the long haul — providing aid, mediating the tensions with India; that we will help stabilize Afghanistan; that we will support the primacy of Pakistan's civilian government. Over time, this could reduce the extremist influence in the military and Pakistan's use of Islamist guerrillas against its neighbors. If it does not — well, the alternative is unthinkable.
So, they will satisfy themselves to become the AfPak power and hegemon. They will continue to dominate and manipulate significant elements of the Taliban. They will control their funding, the scope of their ambitions, agenda, their geographic boundaries and social influence. In so doing, they maintain an instrument of significant, if unofficial, regional military and political influence as long and to the extent they feel they need it.
And they could not have fully achieved this end without the Afghanistan War and the U.S. role in it--including a source of ever-increasing funding for Pakistan, some material amount of which is redirected to the support and direction of the Taliban.
After all the dust clears, Afghanistan will likely be a genuflecting regional area of "mixed sovereignty" subordinate to the regional hegemon, Pakistan. The Kabul government will have its limited geographical sovereignty over Afghanistan's major population centers. As to the South and East, the more outlying districts and provinces, some may be under the control of tribal leaders, but the Taliban will likely control many or most, with others under its influence. And the US and its coalition of countries will continue to provide sufficient funding to assure the entire arrangement works. That is to say, with full understanding and commitment, the U.S. will settle on this arrangement as the most stable and sustainable--the most acceptable--in the region.
(See also the concluding section of my earlier essay, "Exiting Afghanistan", and the discussion of a "mixed sovereignty" solution, as described in a recent Foreign Affairs article by Stephen Biddle, et. al.)
5.3.2011 Postscript:
On Sunday, May 1, 2011, based upon new American intelligence, and at the direction of President Obama, an elite American SEAL team succeeded in it's mission to take Osama bin Laden. He was killed in a compound in Pakistan not far from Islamabad, and he had apparently been there for some time.
It is done, finally. Everything's been said, and said again. There is joy, a shared national, even global joy about it--and also relief, but the kind attended by a shade of unhappiness and resignation that it unavoidably took so long.
We were so close to him in those early days in the Tora Bora mountains of eastern Afghanistan. It's been a long time. And for some time we've heard the coninuing, apparently credible reports that Pakistan was often protecting, even directing and financing the Taliban and its leaders, perhaps even keeping Mullah Omar. We dared not think Osama bin Laden, for there was little al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan or Pakistan--and Pakistan couldn't be that bold, right?
But then we found him. He was in a high-walled, large and conspicuous compound without any detectable communications connections. It was located in an affluent community some 60 miles from the Pakistan capital, Islamabad, and two miles from their principal military academy. And the residents of that community include many Pakistani military families.
When it was built five years ago, someone might have noticed how unusual it was for that residential area, both in size and configuration. Someone might have noticed how anonymous the occupants, how clandestine, perhaps furtive, their activities--especially given it's location, neighbors, and the reputation of the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) for knowing all that goes on and who is doing it.
Surely it is apparent why President Obama chose not to inform the Pakistani government or military of our mission to take bin Laden from that compound--and likely take him dead. Congratulations to the intelligence team and the elite SEAL team that made the mission possible and made it a success.
But should I now revisit and rethink what kind of continuing U.S.- Pakistan relationship remains necessary for regional stability and security--and what kind of relationship is still workable, given our history with this unreliable, mendacious "ally," whose interests and agenda have often proved inconsistent with our own? No, I don't think so. In fact, these revelations are rather consistent with my 2010 understandings and assessment of the ongoing U.S. relationship with Pakistan. So I remain persuaded that my 2010 analysis is likely just as valid, and the end-game realities and prescriptions are likely just as close to what the future will present us.
No comments:
Post a Comment