Last Sunday's 60-minute episode addressed the role of the US in the Syrian civil war: what it might be, what it should be--especially with regard to a punitive US missile strike in response to Syria's broad and murderous use of chemical weapons. Interviews with Presidents Assad and Obama were instructive, but offered little new. It was the interview with Mike Morell, the recently retired No. 2 man at the CIA and a briefer/advisor on Syria to President Obama, that provided understanding of the narrow and tortuous path American policy and actions must negotiate to eventually achieve an acceptable and workable result in Syria.** We'll return to Mr. Morell's interview presently, but first some background and observations.
Many of us have supported the president's call for a time-limited missile attack on Syria, an attack that would target military infrastructure and chemical weapons stores (if they can be located), and generally weaken military capability. We agree with the importance of upholding the standing of international law, rules or norms--however characterized--banning use of chemical weapons. And the only way to uphold it is to enforce it by responding to chemical attacks with punitive measures. To allow deadly use of chemical weapons to proceed with impunity would surely increase the likelihood they would be used again--both in Syria and elsewhere.
Of course, others disagree, and argue that any punitive military response would sooner or later result in our deeper involvement in a civil war that neither our government nor people want. They fear that even a time-and-target-limited missile strike would unleash unpredictable consequences that will precipitate our slide down a slippery slope of expanded military involvement. Their concerns are worth bearing in mind; they are not without reason or merit.
And there is reasonable concern that an expanded military role for the US in Syria can only result in further complicating and damaging relationships among Syria's Middle-Eastern neighbors and their various factions, and U.S. relationships in the region. The disruptions, the instability, would likely spread ever more broadly in the region, a region where Syria's neighbors are already dealing with too many Syria-related problems. Most everyone's interests are better served by increasing stability in the region, including of course, those of the US. On that, most all agree.
The president's assurances that there will result no further military role for the US in Syria, that he would not allow it, have been largely dismissed by those folks most fearful of that very result. To the consternation of many, the president has responded by repeatedly stressing further the limited nature of the proposed missile strike to the point that many are asking whether it would be punitive or consequential in any military sense at all. He appears to be trying too hard to pacify too many camps at the same time, while not being clear about what his real policy and plans are.
Further confounding the analysis has been the complications of the parties to Syria's civil war. As repugnant and damnable as Assad and his regime's conduct have been, the rebel forces have been guilty of their own atrocities--and whether in retaliation or not, it does not help their image or sources of support. The forces making up the rebel opposition are a poorly coordinated, patchwork quilt of constructive, moderate factions and extremist factions with their own, differing aspirations.
The majority of those Syrian freedom fighters are in the first group, those seeking a more moderate government reflecting more democratic values and real accountability to the Syrian people. But at the other extreme are radical Islamist and al Qaida-affiliated groups like the al Nusra Front and others. And although the extremist groups are reported to be a clear minority of the opposition forces, they are also reported to be by far the most effective in the field. Just below the surface, and a point sooner or later raised by many, is the concern that a victory by the rebels would only lead to a second military contest between the more moderate rebel forces and those related to Islamist or al Qaida organizations. And the reality-based fear is that the more moderate forces would lose.
So, a punitive missile attack that weakened Assad too much, enough that he would lose to the rebel opposition, ironically, would not likely produce the result most of the world was looking for. But to fail to respond militarily to the use of chemical weapons--and in the process to leave Assad too strong and continually re-armed and supported by Russia--would likely result in the eventual failure of the rebel opposition and the full reinstatement of Assad's unopposed, despotic rule. This is also not a result most of the world would embrace.
And here is where Mike Morell, the CIA's recently retired No. 2 man, offers us the background of his briefings and advice to President Obama--and helps us better understand and make sense of the president's policy and approach to the US role with regard to the Syrian crisis. If the president has at times sounded indecisive, unclear or confusing about just what his plan was--and he has--it was because he had to address a range of very fluid, dangerous and unpredictable factors. A strengthened rebel opposition (or weakened Syrian military), and a recognized stalemate in fact, appears to be the preferable goal. Why? Because--suggests Mr. Morell--that result offers the most expeditious circumstances for all parties to recognize the wisdom of a negotiated restructuring and staged transition of the Syrian political system and government, one that would better serve the interests of all Syrian people, the region, and the world. Is that a realistic process, an achievable goal? Mr. Morell appears to think so.**
This link, below, will take you to the 60-minutes interview with Mr. Morell. Seldom do we get this kind of candor and timely clarification of what a president is being advised, of what is moving his policy and animating his actions and pronouncements. Although I wish he had said more about the proposed missile strike, I found Mr. Morell's openness, directness and clarity riveting and fascinating. I think you will, too.
(And while you are there, you can access the interviews with Presidents Obama and Assad as well.)
Click on this link:
The Briefer: Ex-CIA No. 2 on Syria crisis - 60 Minutes - CBS News
[**Of course, many may think that the new proposal mediated by Syria's Russian patron, President Putin, may carry the day. Running with an off-hand comment by Secretary of State Kerry, Putin soon after announced that Syria will give up all it's chemical weapons stores for destruction if the US agrees to stand down on the threatened missile strike. With a sigh of relief, many thought this a workable solution and that it changed everything. After all, Syria's President agreed in principal, the United Nations supports the proposal, even the United States has agreed to discussions about the proposal.
But those closest to evaluation of this proposal, including President Obama, Secretary of State Kerry and experts throughout the US government, appear rightly skeptical of the purposes, approach, timing and clarity of what is being proposed. For, the more the process of discussions and negotiations can be delayed or protracted, the more it will work to both strengthen the position of Syria's Assad and make less likely the US missile strike. But the US will prudently keep all its options on the table.
And if the course of the discussions prove a dilatory or disingenuous approach by Assad, then we should be fully prepared to carry out that punitive missile strike on Syrian military targets. But if this process goes on too long without a satisfactory result, will we? Will a punitive strike, already weak on popular and political support, lose more momentum, and be more likely abandoned? If so, what does that portend for the resolution of the Syrian crisis (especially if Mr. Morell's analysis is correct)? Or what type and level of additional support to the moderate rebel forces would then be required (and can weapons provided be kept out of the hands of extremist factions)? And if not, what kind of a strike would then be needed to sufficiently weaken Assad, what scope, targets and duration? An appealing resolution could eventually and easily become a Trojan horse of further complications and challenges.]
